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INTERPRETING THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
THE ADVISORY COMMI'TEE NOTES
Eileen A. Scallen*
I. INTRODUCrION
The Federal Rules of Evidence (Rules) are just two decades old.-
The Rules were drafted with the goal of promoting predictability and
uniformity in the admission of evidence in the federal courts.' At the
same time, the drafters wished to leave some flexibility and discretion
in the administration of the Rules, rejecting the possibility that they
could draft a code that anticipated every possible evidence problem
that might arise.
3
The by-product of codification, however, is the problem of inter-
pretation. The United States Supreme Court4 and several commenta-
tors5 have struggled recently with the following question: How do we
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
I wish to thank Professor Roger Park for his encouragement and support and the editors
and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for all of their assistance.
1. President Ford signed the legislation enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence on
January 3, 1975. Statement on Signing a Bill Establishing Rules of Evidence in Federal
Court Proceedings, 1 PuB. PAPERs 6 (Jan. 3, 1975). For a more detailed description of the
making of the Rules, see infra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
2. Statement on Signing a Bill Establishing Rules of Evidence in Federal Court Pro-
ceedings, supra note 1, at 6.
3. See Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57
NEB. L. Rnv. 908, 908 (1978) ("[T]he answers to all questions that may arise under the
Rules may not be found in specific terms in the Rules."); Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory
of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IowA L. REv. 413, 458 (1989) ("The
[drafters] did not believe there can be ideal evidence rules that trial courts can apply
mechanically."); Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric; Practical Reasoning and the Law of
Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REv. (forthcoming May 1995) ("'[D]rafting fine-tuned rules of
evidence to deal with every case was impossible.'" (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, Forward
to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 7 1942)).
4. See, e.g., Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995); Williamson v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993); United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,
488 U.S. 153 (1988); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988); United States v.
Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
5. See, eg., Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence
After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advi-
sory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the
Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 857 (1992); Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the
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determine what the Rules mean when applying them to concrete
cases? While I have addressed that question in a comprehensive man-
ner elsewhere, 6 this Essay focuses on an essential piece of the puz-
zle-the role of the Advisory Committee Notes in interpreting the
Federal Rules of Evidence.7 Although other articles explore the vir-
tues and vices of traditional legislative history,8 scholars have paid in-
sufficient attention to the unique status and value of the Advisory
Committee Notes. This void was highlighted recently by Justice Ken-
nedy's and Justice Scalia's clashing views in Tome v. United States9 on
the utility of the Advisory Committee Notes.10
This Essay explains the objections to the use of traditional types
of legislative history in interpreting legal texts." It then argues that
these vices, assuming they exist, do not apply to the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes.' This Essay concludes by illustrating these points with
the Tome opinions, arguing that Justice Kennedy uses the Notes
well-respecting them rather than deferring to them-while Justice
Scalia unfairly heaps abuse on this approach.3
II. THE TROUBLE WITH LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
No one has more consistently opposed the use of legislative his-
tory in determining the meaning of legal texts than Justice Antonin
Supreme Court's Approach to the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L.
REV. 267 (1993); Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the
Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REv. 745 (1990); Scallen, supra note 3; Andrew E.
Taslitz, Daubert's Guide to the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Not-So-Plain Meaning Juris-
prudence, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 3 (1995); Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the
Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. (forthcoming 1995); Glen Weissenberger, Are the Federal Rules of Evidence a Stat-
ute?, 55 OHIO ST. L.. 393 (1994); Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Inter-
pretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. LJ. 1307 (1992).
6. Scallen, supra note 3.
7. Although this Symposium focuses on the Federal Rules of Evidence, my remarks
regarding the Advisory Committee Notes also apply to the use of the Advisory Commit-
tees' Notes on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
8. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to
Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383 (1992); Ken-
neth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371.
9. 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995).
10. Compare id. at 698, 702-04 (Kennedy, J., delivering majority opinion) (describing
Notes as useful guide in interpreting Rules) with id. at 706 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (describing Notes as persuasive but not authoritative).
11. See infra part IL
12. See infra part III.
13. See infra part IV.
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Scalia. 4 In his written works and speeches before joining the Court,'5
as well as in his opinions since joining the Court, Justice Scalia has
raised numerous objections to the use of legislative history. He has
argued that courts have been too willing to consult legislative history
when a dispute could have been resolved simply on the basis of the
statute's text.16 In addition, he has ridiculed the idea that legislative
history is evidence of the "intent" or the "purpose" of Congress. 7 He
has consistently stressed that legislators are often largely ignorant of
the content of legislative history.' A typical example is his critique of
Justice Stevens's efforts to set out the legislative history behind Rule
609, dealing with impeachment by prior convictions:
I find no reason to believe that any more than a handful of
the Members of Congress who enacted Rule 609 were aware
of its interesting evolution from the 1942 Model Code; or
that any more than a handful of them (if any) voted, with
respect to their understanding of the word "defendant" and
the relationship between Rule 609 and Rule 403, on the basis
of the referenced statements in the Subcommittee, Commit-
tee, or Conference Committee Reports or floor debates-
statements so marginally relevant, to such minute details, in
such relatively inconsequential legislation. 9
If the legislators are not making and reading legislative history, as
Justice Scalia contends, who is? To answer this question, Justice Scalia
resorts to a type of public choice critique.20 Public choice theory,
which applies the methodology of economics to public policy decision
making, suggests that legislation is more likely to be the product of
14. Several other Reagan appointees to the court of appeals have expressed similar
objections. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice,
74 VA. L. REv. 423, 443 (1988).
15. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REv. 241,254 & n.57 (1992) (discussing speech deliv-
ered by then-Judge Scalia at law schools around country criticizing use of legislative history
in statutory interpretation).
16. Arthur Stock, Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DuKE L.J. 160, 161.
17. Id. at 162-64.
18. Id. at 163.
It is to be assumed-by a sort of suspension of disbelief-that two-thirds of the
Members of both Houses of Congress (or a majority plus the President) were
aware of [the legislative history] and must have agreed with [it]; or perhaps it is to
be assumed-by a sort of suspension of the Constitution-that Congress dele-
gated ... the authority to say what its laws mean.
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1568 n.2 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
19. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504,528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
20. See Frickey, supra note 15, at 252-55.
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control of the legislative agenda or of strategic voting than the product
of deliberation by the legislature as a whole.21 From this perspective
legislative history is meaningless as a guide to legislative intent or pur-
pose as it most likely was manufactured by legislative committee staff
members under the influence of special interest groups.
22
Justice Scalia's opposition to the use of legislative history is
grounded in his view of the roles of the Court and Congress under the
Constitution. 3 In his view, the Court's role is to interpret properly
enacted statutes.24 Legislative history is not part of the duly enacted
statute; thus, legislative history has no authority.25 Congress may not
subvert the law-making process by filling up volumes with legislative
history manufactured by unelected committee staff members and lob-
byists, effectively altering the application of the statute.26 Justice
Scalia's argument is premised, however, on a faulty assumption-that
the Court can perform its role of construing a statute by using only the
language of the statute. I have extensively critiqued this textualist or
"plain meaning approach" elsewhere,27 but it is enough to suggest
here that it might be less constitutionally objectionable to look to the
materials created by committee staff members, who are the agents of
the legislators-even if these agents rely on information from inter-
ested sources-than to look to materials not intended to have any
legal force whatsoever. I am, of course, referring to the textualists'
favorite "authority"-the dictionary.'
21. See id. at 252-53.
22. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). Professors Farber and Frickey link Justice Scalia's view of the
legislative process to the assumptions of public choice theory. Farber & Frickey, supra
note 14, at 437.
23. Stock, supra note 16, at 165-67.
24. Id at 167.
25. Id. at 166.
26. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 1007, 1076-79 (1989); Stock, supra note 16, at 165.
27. See Scallen, supra note 3.
28. See, eg., United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992). I, for one, have never
voted to elect the authors of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, nor the authors
of any other dictionary, to Congress. However, Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary seems to be the Supreme Court's dictionary of choice. See Note, Looking it Up: Dic-
tionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1437, 1439 n.12, 1445 (1994); see
also A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 17 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 71 (1994) (arguing meanings of words used do not
equal meaning of statute); Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103
YALE L.J. 1561, 1565-66 (1994) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
JUDGES (1993)) (explaining several problems with relying on "ordinary"-dictionary-
meaning for evidence of "plain meaning" of legal text).
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Justice Scalia's cynicism about legislative history has been chal-
lenged. Professors Farber and Frickey suggest that Justice Scalia and
his followers have overstated the degree to which legislators are igno-
rant of the content of legislative history2 9 Professors Farber and
Frickey cite research suggesting that "legislators outside the commit-
tee and their staffs focus primarily on the report, not the bill itself."
'30
Given the multitude of pressures and demands on a legislator's time,
it is not surprising that they would turn to a "secondary" source first in
deciding what proposed legislation is all about.3 1 Finally, Justice
Breyer-formerly a professor of law at Harvard University Law
School3z-has noted that a legislative staff member who creates and
reviews these secondary sources does so as the agent of the legislator
and views the materials in light of the legislator's goals.
33
Even assuming that Justice Scalia is correct that reliance on com-
mittee reports or other legislative history allows Congress to abdicate
its law-making responsibilities, this Essay suggests that his criticism
does not have the same force when applied to the Federal Rules of
Evidence Advisory Committee and its Notes.'
III. THE SPECIAL QUALITY OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND
ITS NoTEs
The basic problem with applying Justice Scalia's critique of gen-
eral legislative history to the Advisory Committee Notes is that Con-
gress shares the power to make rules of procedure-including
evidence rules-with the judiciary under the Rules Enabling Act.35
Thus, in dealing with the Rules, Justice Scalia takes aim not only at
the legislative history produced by Congress, but also at the legislative
history produced by the Advisory Committee-an agent of the
29. Farber & Frickey, supra note 14, at 443-46.
30. Id. at 445 (citing WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE
POLICY PROCESS 94 (2d ed. 1984)) (footnote omitted) (noting "[tlhe report... is the prin-
cipal official means of communicating a committee decision to the entire chamber").
31. See id. at 445 n.79 (" 'A good report, therefore, does more than explain-it also
persuades."' (quoting ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 140 (1973))).
32. THE AMERICAN BENCH 19 (Marie T. Finn et al. eds., 7th ed. 1993).
33. Breyer, supra note 8, at 858-59.
34. See infra part III.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Rules Enabling Act provides that
"[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and pro-
cedure and rules of evidence .... Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b) (1988); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1025 (1982) (noting allocation of rulemak-
ing power to Supreme Court).
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Court.36 In extending the scope of his critique, Justice Scalia has not
given sufficient consideration to both the special role of the Advisory
Committee in the legislative process and the significance of its pub-
lished Notes.
3 7
The Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee's role is
slightly more complicated than roles of other types of procedural rules
committees because of the circumstances of the eventual enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The rule-making path usually begins
when the appropriate Advisory Committee prepares a draft rule or
proposed change to a rulea8 The committee's reporter "prepares the
initial drafts of rules changes and 'Committee Notes' explaining their
purpose or intent. ' 39 The Advisory Committee as a whole reviews the
36. Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22
TEx. TECH L. REv. 323, 329 (1991) (noting that Chief Justice of United States Supreme
Court appoints committee members).
37. This Essay stresses the importance of the published Notes, as opposed to the un-
published or personal views of members of the Advisory Committee. Cf. David I. Levine,
The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial Special Masters in Federal Institutional Re-
form Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 753, 764-69 (1984)
(discussing importance of unpublished views of Advisory Committee members). Professor
Levine, in analyzing the authority for appointing special masters, argues that courts should
consider the unpublished papers, transcripts of meetings, or private statements of the Ad-
visory Committee members "because [these members] served, in effect, as a legislative
committee for the drafting of the rules." Id. at 768. I cannot go as far as Professor Levine.
Unpublished correspondence, drafts, or articles on the rules and comments made during
meetings, as a general rule, do not display the same care and consideration of work that is
published-deliberately put forth for public consumption. While I might not ignore such
material, especially if it had direct bearing on the interpretative problem, unpublished ma-
terial simply is not as reliable and credible as published material. In short, while unpub-
lished material may have some persuasive value, it is not very strong. Moreover, one must
distinguish the collective views of the Advisory Committee from the views of individual
members. For example, the Court has cited the views of Professor Cleary, the reporter to
the Advisory Committee on Evidence. See Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 703
(1995). However, Professor Cleary's views as a single member, albeit important, do not
weigh as heavily as the published views of the entire Committee.
38. Baker, supra note 36, at 329; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2) (1988) ("The Judicial
Conference may authorize the appointment of committees to assist the Conference by rec-
ommending rules to be prescribed .... "). The Advisory Committees are composed of
federal judges, practitioners, and academics appointed by the Chief Justice of United
States Supreme Court. Baker, supra note 36, at 329; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2)
("Each such committee shall consist of members of the bench and the professional bar, and
trial and appellate judges."). The Advisory Committees continually monitor the operation
of the rules, develop new rules, or change old rules. Baker, supra note 36, at 329. There
are Advisory Committees for each of the different sets of rules-Civil, Criminal, Bank-
ruptcy, Appellate, and Evidence. Id. The Evidence Advisory Committee was discharged,
however, following the passage of the Federal Rules. 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURO ET AL.,
FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 6 (6th ed. 1994). The Evidence Advisory Com-
mittee has only recently been reactivated. See id
39. Baker, supra note 36, at 329.
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draft, revises it, and sends it on to the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure (Stdiding Committee). 40
The Standing Committee either accepts, rejects, or modifies the
proposed rule submitted by the Advisory Committee.41 If the Stand-
ing Committee approves the draft, it transmits the proposed rule and
the Advisory Committee Notes to the Judicial Conference.42 In turn,
the Judicial Conference transmits its recommendations to the United
States Supreme Court.43 The Court reviews the rule changes, modi-
fies them if it wishes," and transmits them to Congress through an
Order of the Court.45 Congress then has a period of time to review
the rules and either modify or reject them.46 If Congress does not act
on the rules, they go into effect as transmitted by the Court.47 This
basic pattern has been followed since the passage of the Rules En-
abling Act, but was amended in 1988 to open the Advisory Committee
and Standing Committee meetings to the public, 8 to provide for ex-
40. I& Technically, this is the "standing committee on rules of practice, procedure, and
evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b).
41. Baker, supra note 36, at 330.
42. Id. The Judicial Conference of the United States consists of the Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, who serves as the Chairperson of the Conference, the chief
judges of each circuit court of appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the Court of International
Trade, and 12 district court judges. Id. at 328.
43. Id. at 331.
44. Part of the controversy over the rule-making approach is criticism concerning the
degree to which the Court has abdicated its supervisory role over the Standing Commit-
tee's and Advisory Committee's work. See Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 706
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (suggesting Supreme
Court gives too much authority to its committees); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking
Power of the Supreme Court A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 673, 676 (1975)
(suggesting Supreme Court does not exercise sufficient supervision and control over its
committees). However, this criticism appears unwarranted. See Baker, supra note 36, at
331 ("The Supreme Court has played an active part, not infrequently refusing to adopt
rules proposed to it and making changes in the text of the rules."). The Court recently
demonstrated its oversight in withholding its approval of the part of the proposed revision
to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, the rape-shield law, which would -have applied the Rule
to civil cases. COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF JusTICE, THE SuPREME COURT OF THE
UNrIED STATES, TRANS1TrNG AN AMENDmENT TO THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE
AS ADOPTED BY THE COURT, H.R. Doc. No. 250, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. at v (1994). Ac-
cording to Chief Justice Rehnquist, "[slome members of the Court expressed the view that
the amendment might exceed the scope of the Court's authority under the Rules Enabling
Act ....." Id. Congress, however, reinstated the part of Rule 412 that applied the Rule to
civil cases. Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Law. Co-op) 24 (1995).
45. Baker, supra note 36, at 331.
46. See id.
47. Id
48. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401(a),
102 Stat. 4642, 4649 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(1) (1988)).
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tended periods of public comment,4 9 and to provide for a longer pe-
riod of congressional review.50
Yet, in the case of the original package of Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the final step of the process-congressional review-resulted
in a significant moment in the federal rule-making process. When the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence went before Congress, the rules
on privilege caused significant controversy.5 1 As a result, Congress
passed a statute prohibiting the Rules from taking effect absent spe-
cific legislation.52 Congress, through its judicial committees, then con-
ducted a thorough review of the Rules, eliminating all of the proposed
rules on privilege and modifying several other rules. 3 Members of
the Advisory Committee testified before Congress.5 4 Only then was
the final package of Federal Rules of Evidence formally enacted by
Congress55 and signed by President Gerald Ford. 6
The result of this unique finale to the original package is that one
can find "legislative history" on the Rules in several places: the Advi-
sory Committee Notes, the reports of the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice of the House Judiciary Committee, the House Committee on
the Judiciary, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and the Confer-
ence Report.57 Professor Edward W. Cleary, the reporter to the Ad-
visory Committee, suggested soon after the adoption of the Rules that
the Advisory Committee Notes were intended to support and explain
the Rules. 8 He argued that the Notes should be given great weight in
interpreting the Rules:
[The Advisory Committee Notes] accompanied the Rules
through the successive stages of consideration by the Com-
49. Id. § 403(b), 102 Stat. at 4651 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1) (1988)).
50. Id. § 401(a), 102 Stat. at 4649 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988)).
51. There were essentially two objections to the proposed rules on privilege. First,
there were objections to the Court's decisions as to which privileges ought to be recog-
nized. Friedenthal, supra note 44, at 683 n.58. Second, there was a general objection that
creating privileges transgressed the Court's power to make rules of procedure under the
Rules Enabling Act by trespassing on substantive rights. Id. Dean Friedenthal points out
objections to other rules, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 804(24), the residual exception
to the hearsay rule. Id.
52. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9, repealed by Judicial Improve-
ments and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 404(a), 102 Stat. 4642,4651 (1988).
53. 2 JAMES F. BAILEY, III & OSCAR M. TRELLES, II, THE FEDERAL RULES OF Evi-
DENCE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND RELATED DocuMENrs doc. 7, at 74 (1980).
54. See Mengler, supra note 3, at 430-31.
55. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified at 28 U.S.C. app.).
56. 1 SALTzBURG ET AL., supra note 38, at xxv.
57. Cleary, supra note 3, at 913-14.
58. Id. at 913.
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mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States, and the Supreme Court. The
Chief Justice transmitted them to the Congress with the
Rules. They were carefully scrutinized by the involved con-
gressional committees and subcommittees, and, except in
those instances where superseding changes were made in the
Rules by the Congress, must be taken to represent the think-
ing of that body as the equivalent of a committee report ef-
fectively serving as the basis of legislation.5 9
Professor Cleary, in interpreting the Rules, viewed the Notes on rules
not modified by Congress as second in importance only to the text of
the Rules themselves." Given the prominence of Professor Cleary's
role as Reporter to the Advisory Committee, one might discount his
insights as the testimony of an interested witness. However, there are
several independent reasons to support his views.
The Advisory Committee acts as the highly qualified agent of the
judiciary.6 As noted earlier, it is primarily comprised of members of
the federal judiciary, state court judges, practitioners, and academ-
ics.62 These individuals are appointed by the Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, who serves as Chair of the Judicial
Conference.63 While the method of and criteria for selecting commit-
tee members remains somewhat mysterious, their expertise cannot be
questioned.' 4 The Advisory Committee is ultimately accountable to
the Supreme Court, but interacts most directly with those interested
members of the bar and judiciary who comment on proposed rules
59. Id. (footnotes omitted).
60. See id.
61. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 38.
63. Baker, supra note 36, at 328.
64. The newly reconstituted Advisory Committee on Evidence consists of Judge Ralph
K. Winter, Jr. (2d Cir.), chair; Judge Jerry E. Smith (5th Cir.); Judge Fern M. Smith (N.D.
Cal.); Judge Milton L. Shador (N.D. Ill.); Judge James T. Turner (Ct. Cl.); Chief Justice
Harold G. Clarke (Ga. Sup. Ct.); Professor Kenneth S. Broun (Univ. of N.C. School of
Law); Attorney Gregory P. Joseph; Attorney John M. Kobayashi; and Attorney James K.
Robinson. Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence Starts Work,
NEWSLETrER (Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., Sec. on Evid.), May 1993, at 1, 2 (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). Professor Margaret Berger (Brooklyn Law School)
is the reporter to the committee. Id. at 1. The original Advisory Committee was just as
distinguished. See 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACFICE AND PROCEDURE § 5006, at 98 & n.27 (1978). While there are some practition-
ers on the committee, the American Bar Association has made it clear that it would like to
see more practitioners on all of the Advisory Committees. See ABA Seeks Lawyer Input
on Rules Drafting, Nixes Mandatory Court-Annexed Arbitration, 63 U.S.L.W. 2081, 2097
(Aug. 16, 1994).
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and the Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference. 65 In its draft-
ing, soliciting comments, and revising, the Advisory Committee acts as
a buffer between the highly politicized interests of the general bar and
the judiciary responsible for promulgating the rules. Thus, while the
Advisory Committee Notes might be roughly analogous to a congres-
sional committee report, the Notes are not produced by unsupervised
staff members and lobbyists with specific agendas.
The analogy to committee reports does, however, provide a sec-
ond reason to value the Notes as a source of interpretative guidance.
Judge Richard Posner, who generally agrees with the public choice
critique of the legislative process, argues for careful consideration of
some legislative history because it often contains the true terms of the
legislative bargains or compromises reached:
[S]ince an unknown fraction of all bills represent "deals"
struck with or between interest groups, it is not necessarily
true that each member of the legislative majority behind a
particular bill will have bothered to study the details of the
bill he voted for; he may simply have assented to the deal
struck by the sponsors of the bill. And unless the terms of
the deal are stated accurately in the committee reports and
in the floor comments of the sponsors, the sponsors will have
difficulty striking deals in the future.66
The Advisory Committee receives comments from numerous sources
and must balance the competing interests of several constituencies or
points of view.67 Such compromises are more likely to be explained in
the Notes than embodied in the Rules themselves because the drafters
65. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES, Feb. 9,
1995, available in WESTLAW, U.S.-Orders database [hereinafter REPORT OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE] (noting the process followed by Advisory Committee in reviewing pro-
posed Rules 413-415, including notices sent to "all federal judges, about 900 evidence law
professors, 40 women's rights organizations, and 1,000 other individuals and interested or-
ganizations" in order to solicit comments). See also Baker, supra note 36, at 329-31 (sum-
marizing interaction among advisory committees, Standing Committee, and Judicial
Conference, including efforts to solicit public comment by notices published in Federal
Register and by publishing proposed rules in advance sheets of Supreme Court Reporter,
Federal Reporter, and Federal Supplement, as well as sending copies to other publishers,
chief justices of each state, and other interested individuals).
66. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE- FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 269 (1985).
67. See supra note 65. See also Charles Alan Wright, Forward: The Malaise of Federal
Rulemaking, 14 Rv. LrTIG. 1, 8 (1994) (commenting from first-hand experience that
"[t]he [rule-making] process is ordinarily a slow and cautious one, with one or more drafts
widely circulated and the subject of public and scholarly comment, and with ample oppor-
tunity to rethink matters, to avoid blunders, and to improve drafts").
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wanted to keep the Rules flexible, rather than creating a detailed code
to cover every problem.68 The compromises-or "deals"-described
in the Notes must be given some real weight to ensure that those con-
stituencies feel their voices have been heard.
IV. TiH UsE AND ABUSE OF THE NOTES iN
TOME V. UNITED STA TES
The United States Supreme Court has not been a model of clarity
and consistency in its approach toward the Advisory Committee
Notes. It has frequently cited to the Notes,69 but has fluctuated in its
description of the role the Notes play in the interpretation of the evi-
dence rules.70 The apparent tension over the role of the Notes has
been growing among some members of the Court.
Concurring in Williamson v. United States,71 Justice Kennedy
urged the Court to give great weight to the Advisory Committee Note
in interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). 72 Justice Kennedy
argued:
When as here the text of a Rule of Evidence does not answer
a question that must be answered in order to apply the Rule,
and when the Advisory Committee Note does answer the
question, our practice indicates that we should pay attention
to the Advisory Committee Note. We have referred often to
those Notes in interpreting the Rules of Evidence, and I see
no reason to jettison that well-established practice here.73
Thus, Justice Kennedy apparently adopts Professor Cleary's view, that
where the text of a Rule does not solve the problem-and it is un-
likely that a dispute over the meaning of a rule would reach the Court
if the text was that "plain"-and the Advisory Committee Note does
68. See Scallen, supra note 3.
69. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 n.9,
2796 (1993); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 516, 522 (1989); Beech Air-
craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 n.8 (1988); Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.
681, 688 (1988); United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562 (1988); Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 179 n.2 (1987); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984).
70. Compare Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 166 (1988) (giving notes
great weight) with Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating notes should be given no weight) and Williamson v. United States, 114
S. Ct. 2431, 2436 (1994) (refusing to decide "exactly how much weight to give the Notes in
this particular situation").
71. 114 S. Ct. 2431.
72. Id. at 2442 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) deals
with the admissibility of statements against interest. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(3).
73. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2442 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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indicate how the problem should be solved, then the Note should be
given great weight.74
The majority opinion in Williamson, written by Justice O'Connor,
also quotes from the Advisory Committee Note, but concludes that it
is more ambiguous than Justice Kennedy suggests:
Without deciding exactly how much weight to give the Notes
in this particular situation, compare Schiavone v. Fortune,
477 U.S. 21, 31, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 2385, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986)
(Notes are to be given some weight), with Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528, 109 S.Ct. 1981,
1994-95, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring in
judgment) (Notes ought to be given no weight), we conclude
that the policy expressed in the statutory text points clearly
enough in one direction that it outweighs whatever force the
Notes may have.75
However, the Court's attempt to find the answer in the text of the
Rule alone is highly questionable. 76 The goal of the Williamson ma-
jority seemed to be to resolve the case on rule interpretation grounds,
thereby avoiding a difficult constitutional question under the Confron-
tation Clause.77 To accomplish this goal, the Court had to finesse the
content and role of the Advisory Committee Note.
Justice Kennedy had another chance to argue for the importance
of the Advisory Committee Notes in Tome v. United States.78 In Tome
the Court interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which
allows for the admission of a prior consistent statement if "[t]he de-
clarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examina-
tion" and if the statement is "offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influ-
ence or motive. ' 79 The precise question in Tome was whether, as
under the common law, the statement had to have been made before
the "'improper influence or motive'" arose."0
Tome was charged with sexually abusing his four-year-old daugh-
ter.81 Because the case arose on the Navajo Indian Reservation, it
74. See Cleary, supra note 3, at 913.
75. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2436.
76. See Scallen, supra note 3.
77. See Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2435.
78. 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995).
79. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(B).
80. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 699 (quoting FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(B)).
81. 1&
[Vol. 28:1283
INTERPRETING RULES OF EVIDENCE
was tried in federal court.' The prosecution asserted that Tome, who
was divorced from the child's mother and had primary physical cus-
tody of the child, sexually abused the child and that the child disclosed
the abuse to her mother while they were on vacation.83 The defense's
theory was that the allegations were fabricated so that the mother,
who had unsuccessfully petitioned for primary custody of the child,
would not have to return the child to her father.'
At trial, the child, now six and a half years old, grew increasingly
reticent in answering questions.8 5 After she testified the prosecution
introduced seven different statements describing the sexual abuse that
the child made to various witnesses.86 The trial court admitted the
statements despite the defendant's objection, finding that the state-
ments rebutted the defense's assertion that the statements were
fabricated so that the child could stay with the mother, even though
these statements were made after the alleged motive to fabricate them
arose.
87
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the
"'pre-motive requirement is a function of the relevancy rules, not the
hearsay rules.' "8 The court held that "'the relevance of the prior
consistent statement is more accurately determined by evaluating the
strength of the motive to lie, the circumstances in which the statement
is made, and the declarant's demonstrated propensity to lie.' ,89 A
five to four majority of the United States Supreme Court rejected the
Tenth Circuit's balancing approach, holding that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in-
corporates the common-law requirement that the statement be made






87. Id at 700. The trial court also admitted one of the statements, made to a babysit-
ter, under the residual exception, Rule 803(24), and statements to two doctors under the
exception for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, Rule
803(4). Id. The Court noted that the prosecution had offered the statements of a social
worker under both Rules 803(24) and 801(d)(1)(B), but the trial court did not make clear
on which ground it was admitting the statement. Id.
88. Id. (quoting United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 350 (10th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 696 (1995)).
89. Id. (quoting United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 350 (10th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 696 (1995)).
90. Id. at 702.
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Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court.91 He began by
noting the long existence of the common-law "premotive" require-
ment, and its endorsement by the leading common law commentators,
McCormick and Wigmore. He then turned to the text of the rule
itself and found that:
The language of the Rule, in its concentration on rebutting
charges of recent fabrication, improper influence and motive
to the exclusion of other forms of impeachment, as well as in
its use of wording which follows the language of the com-
mon-law cases, suggests that it was intended to carry over the
common-law pre-motive rule.93
In this part of his argument, Justice Kennedy's opinion resembles that
of Justice O'Connor in Williamson.94 Both Justices try to argue that
the text embodies a policy;95 yet, it would be more direct to admit that
the text truly does not answer the question, and that the Court needed
to look elsewhere for guidance in applying the rule.
But where Justice O'Connor stops with the text, Justice Kennedy
continues to build on his argument. In a part of the opinion joined
only by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy
turned to the Advisory Committee Note on Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to sup-
port his conclusion that the Rule embodies the common-law premo-
tive requirement.96 He emphasized that where "'Congress did not
amend the Advisory Committee's draft in any way.., the Commit-
tee's commentary is particularly relevant in determining the meaning
of the document Congress enacted.' "97 Justice Kennedy also stressed
the distinguished credentials of the Committee and that it had "con-
sulted and considered the views, criticisms, and suggestions of the aca-
demic community in preparing the Notes."98
Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Advisory Committee drew
heavily upon the common law as portrayed in the work of Wigmore
and McCormick, and when drafting a rule that was a significant depar-
ture from the common law, "in general the Committee said so." 99 He
91. Id. at 698.
92. Id. at 700.
93. Id. at 702.
94. See Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2434-36 (1994).
95. Im. at 2435.
96. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 702-04.
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illustrated this with several examples where the Committee had re-
jected the common-law approach and stated that the Notes for Rule
801(d)(1)(B) contain no indication that the Committee intended to
depart from the common-law premotive requirement. 100 Justice Ken-
nedy interpreted this silence as indicative of intent to incorporate that
requirement because "it is difficult to imagine that the drafters, who
noted the new substantive use of prior consistent statements, would
have remained silent if they intended to modify the premotive
requirement."''
Justice Kennedy supported this argument by looking to the Advi-
sory Committee's general approach in structuring Rule 801(d)(1), the
rule dealing with prior statements. 02 He pointed to the Committee's
rejection of Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(1), which would have al-
lowed the introduction of any out-of-court statement by a declarant
who testifies at the trial, subject to the other rules of evidence.103 Jus-
tice Kennedy argued that if the Tenth Circuit's balancing approach
was adopted in lieu of the premotive requirement, the distinction be-
tween 801(d)(1)(B) and Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(1) would disap-
pear, for any witness's damaging testimony could be met by an
allegation that the witness was fabricating, opening "the floodgates to
any prior consistent statement that satisfied Rule 403. ' '1"4 Justice
Kennedy concluded this section of the opinion by establishing a pre-
sumption that "'[a] party contending that legislative action changed
settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature intended
such a change.' "10,5
In the next section of the opinion, which was joined by Justice
Scalia, Justice Kennedy rejected the government's attempt to rely on
academic commentators who were critical of the limits on the use of
prior statements when the declarant testified at trial.'0 6 These com-
mentators suggested that courts move toward a balancing approach
for determining the admissibility of prior statements. 7 The Court re-
100. 1& at 702-03.




105. Id. at 704 (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989)).
106. Id. at 704-05.
107. Id. at 704 (citing Mason Ladd, The Relationship of the Principles of Exclusionary
Rules of Evidence to the Problem of Proof, 18 MINN. L. Ruv. 506 (1934); Edmund M.
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REv.
177, 192-96 (1948); Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. Rnv. 331,
344-45 (1961)).
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jected this argument in large part because the Advisory Committee
also rejected it:
The statement-by-statement balancing approach advocated
by the Government and adopted by the Tenth Circuit creates
the precise dangers the Advisory Committee noted and
sought to avoid: It involves considerable judicial discretion;
it reduces predictability; and it enhances the difficulties of
trial preparation because parties will have difficulty knowing
in advance whether or not particular out-of-court statements
will be admitted. 0
Justice Kennedy concluded his argument by acknowledging the poten-
tial difficulty of applying the premotive requirement, but stressed that
"as the Advisory Committee commented," it was less of a burden and
more predictable than the balancing approach suggested by the gov-
ernment and the Tenth Circuit.10 9
Justice Scalia fied an opinion concurring in the judgment and
joining most of Justice Kennedy's opinion. 110 He refused, however, to
join the part of the opinion "devoted entirely to a discussion of the
Advisory Committee's Notes" and which "gives effect to those Notes
not only because they are 'a respected source of scholarly commen-
tary,' ... but also because they display the 'purpose' or 'inten[t]' of the
draftsmen.""' Justice Scalia allowed the references to purpose and
intent io distract him, and unreasonably heaped abuse upon those
who rely on the Advisory Committee Notes. While he confessed that
he had committed the sin of acquiescing in or relying on the Notes, he
begged for forgiveness from the gods of interpretation: "More mature
consideration has persuaded me that is wrong.""12 He reiterated his
objections to legislative history in general," 3 and, while he noted that
"the Notes are assuredly persuasive scholarly commentaries-ordina-
rily the most persuasive-concerning the meaning of the Rules,""' 4 to
him they have no authority.
108. Id. at 704-05.
109. Id. at 705. Kennedy also sympathized with the problems of proof in child abuse
cases, but noted that while the evidence rules cannot be altered for any class of cases, the
statements might be admissible under another hearsay exception, such as Rule 803(24). Id.
110. Id at 706 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
111. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citations omitted).
112. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
113. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
114. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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The dichotomy of "persuasive" versus "authoritative" texts is a
favorite of Justice Scalia."5 However, it simply makes no sense. The
dichotomy endows authoritative texts with a magical force not seen
since the days of legal formalism. The problem courts face here is that
the meaning of specific rules of evidence, acknowledged to be the au-
thority-in the sense of the controlling principle of law-is unclear. If
the power of the rule to resolve the dispute at hand was clear, the
dispute would never have reached the Court. The only issue is which
of the competing alternative interpretations is the most persuasive or
"sound" construction. Justice Scalia begged the question by declaring
the text of the Rules authoritative and all other sources "merely"
persuasive.
In addition, Justice Scalia ignored the special quality of the rule-
making process, in which the Court and its agents have a unique role.
He drew strange analogies:
[The Notes] bear no special authoritativeness as the work of
the draftsmen, any more than the views of Alexander Hamil-
ton (a draftsman) bear more authority than the views of
Thomas Jefferson (not a draftsman) with regard to the mean-
ing of the Constitution. It is the words of the Rules that have
been authoritatively adopted-by this Court, or by Congress
if it makes a statutory change. In my view even the adopting
Justices' thoughts, unpromulgated as Rules, have no authori-
tative (as opposed to persuasive) effect, any more than their
thoughts regarding an opinion (reflected in exchanges of
memoranda before the opinion issues) authoritatively
demonstrate the meaning of that opinion. And the same for
the thoughts of congressional draftsmen who prepare statu-
tory amendments to the Rules." 6
These analogies just do not work. First, Justice Scalia obscured the
issue by focusing on the "authoritativeness" of secondary sources.
One can concede that the individual views of draftsmen on the mean-
ing of the Constitution are not binding on a court, yet still argue that
Hamilton's views are more persuasive, more thoughtful, or "weight-
ier" than Jefferson's in light of Hamilton's experience in drafting the
language. Second, even if Jefferson's views on the meaning on the
115. See, e.g., Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to "the authoritative, as opposed to the persuasive,
weight of the [House Committee] Report").
116. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 706 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(citation omitted).
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Constitution have the same "persuasive" weight as Hamilton's, to
compare the process of drafting the Constitution to the rule-making
process ignores the Rules Enabling Act's allocation of power between
Congress and the Court-including the Court's agents. The rule-mak-
ing process is now an ongoing joint venture between the Court and
the Congress. The Advisory Committee play a vital role in negotiat-
ing the needs of the adversary system and the concerns of Congress.117
Finally, the analogy to the Court's preliminary thoughts expressed in
memoranda is inapposite, for while the Court's preliminary memos
are never intended for public consumption, the Advisory Committee
Notes are expressly intended for that purpose." 8
Justice Scalia's argument approached absurdity when he tried to
extend the problem of the naive or lazy legislator to his colleagues:
"[T]here is no certainty that either we or [Congress] read those
thoughts, nor is there any procedure by which we formally endorse or
disclaim them."" 9 While nothing is certain, as the saying goes, I find
it highly improbable that United States Supreme Court Justices would
transmit proposed rules of practice and procedure to Congress with-
out reading both the rules and their accompanying commentary.
Moreover, there certainly is a means of disapproving both the Notes
and the proposed rules themselves. When the Chief Justice transmits
the rules to Congress, it is with an explanatory letter that can even
contain dissenting views.120 Justice Scalia himself has made use of this
to make his opinions very clear. 2'
In Tome, Justice Scalia refused to acknowledge the "authority" of
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 801(d)(1)(B), although he rec-
ognized its "persuasive" value. 22 His distinction added nothing to
our understanding of the real problem-what weight to give the Advi-
117. A majority of the Advisory Committee on Evidence was opposed to proposed
Rules 413-415 on the grounds that the concerns of Congress embodied in those rules are
already dealt with by the Federal Rules of Evidence and that the proposed rules raise
significant dangers of undue prejudice and constitutional problems. REPORT OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 65. However, the Advisory Committee recognized that it
did not have the power to reverse the policy decisions made by Congress, so it simply
redrafted the proposed rules in order to make them more consistent with the other federal
rules and to minimize constitutional infirmities. Id. This treatment of a controversial situa-
tion illustrates the Advisory Committee's respect and concern for both the adversary sys-
tem and the role of Congress in promulgating rules.
118. See Baker, supra note 36, at 329; Cleary, supra note 3, at 913-14.
119. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 706 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
120. See supra note 44 (discussing transmittal of proposed Rule 412).
121. See, e.g., Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 40 U.S.L.W. 4365,
4392 (Apr. 22, 1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 706 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
[Vol. 28:1283
INTERPRETING RULES OF EVIDENCE
sory Committee Notes when the text of the rule does not resolve the
issue at hand. Moreover, while he disparaged the Advisory Commit-
tee note as "authoritative" evidence of the "intent" of the drafters or
the "purpose" of the rule, he was also willing to look to the common-
law cases-another secondary source-for evidence of the meaning of
the rule without explaining the relative weight of these secondary
sources.
123
I have argued for an approach to interpretation of evidence rules
that is consistent with the forensic context in which these questions
arise-the process of practical reasoning. 24 The practical reasoning
approach recognizes that, like the process of proof in a courtroom,
interpretation is a process of argumentation and persuasion. Under
this approach interpretation becomes a genuine process of "construc-
tion": The interpreter uses all of the possible sources of a legal text's
meaning, such as its language, the 'language of related texts, evidence
of the intentions of the drafters of the text, the historical context of
the text, previous interpretations of the text, the instrumental aspects
of potential interpretations, and the evolution of the language of the
text over time to "construct" the meaning of the text in a particular
situation.125
Additionally, I contend that the Supreme Court's most "solid"
constructions manifest the qualities of candor and completeness, qual-
ities essential to the persuasiveness and the educative function of the
Court. A vital part of this process is the consideration and treatment
of the evidence of the drafter's thoughts as to the meaning of the legal
text, which in the case of the Federal Rules of Evidence, means the
Advisory Committee Notes as well as the more traditional congres-
sional legislative materials-reports of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and their conference
committees.
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Rules of Evidence are special statutes and the ap-
proaches to statutory interpretation must be thoughtfully applied to
them. The Advisory Committee Notes are special, high-quality legis-
123. IL (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgement). It is not clear
whether Justice Scalia was persuaded more by the Advisory Committee Note or the com-
mon-law cases, the language of which is "track[ed]" in the rule. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgement).
124. Scallen, supra note 3.
125. Id. (citing Farber & Frickey, supra note 14, at 461-65).
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lative history. To say they are not binding is to beg the question of
what value they have. The rule-making process is long and difficult.
It is unreasonable to expect every question about the application of a
rule to result in a revision of that rule. Where the text does not solve
the problem, but the Notes do help to solve it, the Notes should carry
great weight, and the Court should not be shy about respecting the
work of its distinguished agents.
At the same time, it would be an abuse of the Advisory Commit-
tee Notes to rely on them to the exclusion of other sources of interpre-
tation. To use my own analogy, if Justice Scalia means that the Notes
are not direct evidence of the meaning of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, I would have to agree. The only direct evidence of the mean-
ing of the Rules is their text. But, as we have seen time and time
again, the text of a rule does not always "speak for itself." The only
method of "construing" a rule in such cases is to consider circumstan-
tial evidence of its meaning, which includes the published Advisory
Committee Notes. Dean McCormick emphasized that circumstantial
evidence can be just as probative as direct evidence; thus, the fact that
circumstantial evidence may be only a building block and not the
building itself is not a reason to exclude it from consideration.'26 With
apologies to Dean McCormick, the Advisory Committee Notes are
not just a brick, but rather a part of the foundation of the wall of
evidence, and ought to be regarded as such.'2 7
126. CRARLEs T. McCoRmIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 317 (1954)
("[W]hen [a piece of circumstantial evidence] is offered and judged singly and in isolation,
as it frequently is, it cannot be expected by itself to furnish conclusive proof of the ultimate
fact to be inferred.... A brick is not a wall.").
127. See id
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